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I tolerate this century, but I don't enjoy it.

All of the ephemera that is far too trivial to be bothered with elsewhere on this site or, depending on your point of view, a meta-commentary on it. This ephemera includes, but is not limited to art, music and literature. Most of the content here will be discussed in terms that are as abstract as possible, reality being a singularly overrated concept.

Vanity Fair

Posted in England on June 23rd, 2007 by Richard

In his latest collection of essays, Milan Kundera wrote that the social changes in the Czech Republic after the fall of communism, as property rights were returned to their original owners and a middle class accompanied by social inequality returned overnight. Kundera wrote that after Kafka and Broch he did not feel equipped to write a Balzacian novel on the subject, but the material nonetheless found its way into his last novel, Ignorance. I tend to agree with Kundera; when nineteenth century novelists like Thackerary and Dickens wrote it was out of a reforming spirit that seems remote in an age characterised by its rejection of reforming projects in favour of pragmatic and incremental measures. Nontheless, modern society is perhaps easier to describe in the terms Eliot and Zola had available to them than the ones devised for the age of Freud, Marx and World War.

I live in an English provinical town. It doesn’t matter which one, as like most English provincial towns it suffers from an absence of any sense of place and could very easily be found in any part of the country. When I arrived there, it was a rather dowdy and humdrum place with its rows of terraced housing, grey sixties concrete and a town centre that was invariably empty and closed on Sundays. Since then, much of that quiet town centre has been dismembered and reconstructed, with gleaming new shopping centres and towering hotels dwarfing and frequently demolishing the redbrick and terracotta building surrounding them. The centre now throngs with people at any time of the week, from incessant shopping to incessant clubbing and drinking. Conspicuous consumption sets the tone throughout, with old fashioned furniture shops making way for casinos. Shops routinely go bankrupt and new franchises open in their place at a dizzying speed. Voices in multiple languages fill the streets as English newspaper headlines on rising house prices or the risk of social inequality leading to rioting alternate with newspaper headlines written in Polish. Posters calling for the destruction of the state of Israel briefly appear before being torn down. Small shops now stock readymade ghoulash, pickled gherkin and tripe while swanky restaurants for the affluent open nearby. Mosques, Methodist, Baptist and Polish churches nestle close to one another. Gleaming glass and steel offies or flats rise up everywhere.

Elsewhere, just at the margins of all this, the number of down and outs seems to have swelled and the streets seem to be filled with the displaced. I pass by a man at a bus stop every morning shouts loudly into the air and gesticulates wildly while those that have joined him in the queue stare fixedly down at the ground. A man in a supermarket queue gently talks gibberish to himself and chuckles. Those that had joined him in that queue also stare fixedly down at the ground. Estates with rotting sixties tower blocks and burnt our cars are left to fester. Crime has increased markedly with reportings of shooting having become common, in spite of the burgeoning numbers of CCTV cameras now found on every street corner. Needles and glass from smashed car windows are regularly found on pavements. Television adverts appear for social darwinist programmes that celebrate entrepreneurship and the firing of the substandard.

It is rather easier to describe this picture than to interpret it. I would not wish to live in a slightly earlier time, with a more homogenous, repressed and straightlaced society but that does little to accommodate me to the rather alinated society I do happen to find myself in. I have often enough cited Anthony Giddens’ work on post-traditionalist societies and in theory much of what I see around should be an exemplar of it. In practice, it is not quite as easy and as the country transitions from one administration to another, it is difficult not to conclude that England as a place is more unequal, more divided, less liberal and more brutual than it seemed to be before. As an end-note, this article on London’s recent socio-economic history puts my rather anecdotal account of how England has changed into a more specific context:

"Each year from 1997 to 2006 saw a net inflow of 100,000 foreigners to London, to which must be added the population’s natural growth (more births than deaths) of 50,000 to 75,000 a year. These increases are partly offset by an annual outflow of around 80,000 to the rest of Britain—take immigration out of the picture and, according to some estimates, the capital’s population would have fallen by around 600,000 between 1993 and 2000. The net effect of this population "churn" is that London’s population is now around 35 per cent foreign-born, a figure moving rapidly towards 50 per cent…

There are 108,000 people in London earning over £100,000 a year, which as a proportion of its population is more than twice the national figure, and there are 38,000 who earn more than £200,000—over a third of the national total. (If those working in the City of London were removed from the national earnings figures, Britain’s income differentials would look far more like the more egalitarian continental European countries.) Even average annual earnings in London are far higher than the rest of the country: £37,323 compared with £24,301 for Britain as a whole…

As London adapts to its new status as the global city, there remain doubts about the quality of life it is able to offer the majority of its citizens. London’s growth is already creating stark inequalities. The new jobs being created tend to be at the very top and bottom of the pay scale. Despite all the wealth generated in the city, London has some of the highest levels of poverty in the country, as well as the highest unemployment rate, at over 7 per cent. From 2002 to 2005, 52 per cent of children in inner London were living below the poverty line. As Livingstone himself says, “It’s worse being poor here than anywhere else.” The cost of housing, as well as transport, is very high for those on low incomes. The average house price in London is almost £300,000 (almost 50 per cent higher than the British average), and, if you are not an emergency case, the wait for public rental housing can be as long as three years. The expected sharp increase in population can only exacerbate those problems…

The most obvious symptom of social stress is the rise in support for extremist politics in London—challenging Livingstone’s rosy vision of a happily multicultural and unsegregated city… The problems are particularly acute in the borough of Barking & Dagenham, which has in the space of a few years lost a Ford assembly plant that had employed generations and gained a host of new ethnic groups, attracted by low house prices. The result was a striking result for the BNP in last year’s local elections—they won 12 seats to become the council’s official opposition. The BNP has not yet reached the mid-1970s levels of support for the National Front, but a survey at the 2005 general election found that the capital had among the highest levels of potential support for the BNP of any part of the country, with 23 per cent of respondents saying they might vote for the party… Ronald Dworkin once described New York as a "carnival on the edge of frenzy." Modern London occasionally totters close to an edge of this kind."

On Bakhtin

Posted in Language, Literature, Theory on June 19th, 2007 by Richard

In the unlikely event that I have regular readers, some of them might happen to recall that one of my obscure passions is the early twentieth century literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin:

"Just as Bakhtin’s work is among other things a coded critique of Soviet autocracy, so postmodernism springs in large part from the rout of modern Marxism. In the work of Baudrillard, Lyotard and others, it began as an alternative creed for disenchanted leftists. Its obsession with discourse makes sense in an age short on political action. Instead of setting fire to campuses, American students now cleanse their speech of incorrectness. If Marxism had been shamefully coy about sexuality, postmodernism makes a fetish of it. The warm, desiring, palpable body is a living rebuke to all those bloodless abstractions about the Asiatic mode of production. Instead of grand narratives that lead to the gulag, we have a plurality of mini-narratives. Since doctrinal absolutes dismember bodies, relativism is the order of the day. If castrating homosexuals is part of your culture, it would be ethnocentric of me to object. Revolution is no longer on the agenda, but sporadic subversions may stand in for it. Class politics yields to identity politics. The system cannot be overthrown, but at least it can be deconstructed….

It means that every word or utterance is refracted through a host of other, perhaps antagonistic idioms, through which alone its meaning can be grasped. It thus bears an affinity with the post-structuralist concept of textuality. There can be no unmediated truth. We come to ourselves, as many modern thinkers have claimed, through a medium which is profoundly strange to us. Language for Bakhtin is a cockpit of warring forces, as each utterance finds itself occupied from within by alien significations. Every sign glances sideways at other signs, bears the traces of them within its body, and faces simultaneously towards speaker, object, context and addressee. Like human subjects, words are constituted by their relations to otherness, and language is always porous, hybrid and open-ended. There was never a first word, and there could never be a last one. The inherent unfinishedness and unpredictability of language – the fact that I can never deduce from any two of your words what the third one is going to be – is a token of human freedom, and thus in a broad sense political. Signs are never self-identical, and always mean more than they say (a surplus that includes what they don’t say). The enemy is what Bakhtin dubs ‘monologism’, meaning the kind of meta-language which seeks to subdue this irrepressible heterogeneity. At times in his work, it is a polite word for Stalinism…

Pechey argues persuasively that Bakhtin was out to rewrite the history of modernity. Epistemology yields to aesthetics, as the abstract reason of the Enlightenment is replaced by the sensuous particularity of art. A brutally instrumental rationality makes way for a form of communicative reason. The falsely autonomous subject of the modern age is overturned by the dialogical self. In all these ways, the aesthetic in the modern age becomes the repository of lost or sidelined forms of knowledge."

Eagleton’s review does an excellent task of highlighting what I found so appealing in Bakhtin; his defence of the untidy, unfinished and chaotic, that which defies order and system. Nonetheless, for all of the comparisons evinced here Bakhtin’s work contains no assumption that there is nothing outside language, pertains largely to the formal and linguistic properties of the novel and lacks any metaphysical critique of meta-narratives. One can draw some parallels with Derrida, viewing differance and dialogism as being spiritually akin concepts but any such parallel is necessarily rather strained. The figure Bakhtin does remind me of isn’t so much Derrida but Sartre. Both Bakhtin and Sartre were drawn in many respects to Marxism as a philosophy (albeit with Sartre far more committed to it than the man who was to die in one Stalin’s gulags). In the former case, Bakhtin’s work treats of the novel in materialistic terms as a product of specific cultural, historical and social forces as much as the linguistic ones Eagleton highlights. His work nonetheless treats of the ways in which these forces combine to ensure that the novel is, to purloin a phrase, condemned to be free or, to use Bakhtin’s phrase, to be dialogic. Similarly, Sartre’s work struggles to yoke together the heterogenous elements of existentialism and communism, of how freedom could gear itself to the social conditions it found itself in. The polyphonic novel was naturally the ideal vehicle for Sartre to manifest those ideas, utilising concepts like the cutups and multiple viewpoints that he had borrowed from Dos Passos but which also bore a distinct resemblance to Bakhtinian dialogism.

Language and recursion

Posted in Culture, Language, Religion on June 16th, 2007 by Richard

Having been interested for a while in the ideas of Sapir and Lee Whorf, the recent research on the Piraha language, which has occasionally been characterised as providing evidence for those theories, was something I was immediately interested in. Looking into it in more detail, I don’t think it actually does support Sapir to any marked intent, but as this article argues, it does challenge many current assumptions about language and consciousness:

"So in the case of Piraha, the language I’ve worked with the longest of the 24 languages I’ve worked with in the Amazon, for about 30 years, Pirahã doesn’t have expressions like "John’s brother’s house". You can say “John’s house”, you can say "John’s brother", but if you want to say "John’s brother’s house", you have to say "John has a brother. This brother has a house". They have to say it in separate sentences.

One answer that’s been given when I claim that Piraha lacks recursion, is that recursion is a tool that’s made available by the brain, but it doesn’t have to be used. But then that’s very difficult to reconcile with the idea that it’s an essential property of human language—if it doesn’t have to appear in a given language then, in principle, it doesn’t have to appear in any language. If it doesn’t have to appear in one part of a language, it doesn’t have to appear in any part of a language… If you go back to the Pirahã language, and you look at the stories that they tell, you do find recursion. You find that ideas are built inside of other ideas, and one part of the story is subordinate to another part of the story. That’s not part of the grammar per se, that’s part of the way that they tell their stories.

So the evidence is still being collected, the claims that I have made about Pirahã lacking recursion and the fact that Piraha is an evidence that there probably isn’t a need for universal grammar. Contrary to Chomsky’s proposal that universal grammar is the best way to think about where language comes from, another possibility is just that humans have different brains that are different globally from those of other species, that they have a greater general intelligence that can be exploited for all sorts of purposes in human thinking and human problem-solving… The ongoing investigation of these claims and alternatives to universal grammar, an architectonic effect of culture on grammar as whole, and the implications of this for the way that we’ve thought about language for the last 50 years are serious. If I am correct then the research so ably summarized in Steve Pinker’s book The Language Instinct might not be the best way to think about things."

What particularly interests me about these arguments is the role they play in the overall history of ideas. In contrast to the ideas of Marx, Freud, Skinner and Foucault, which all assumed to varying degrees that environmental forces are markedly more important than what would now be termed genetic considerations, modern conceptions of rationality have increasingly spurned the idea of the blank slate and moved towards a conception that bears a marked resemblance to that of Thomas Hobbes, if we substitute the term ‘genes’ for ‘passions.’ As Edward O Wilson observed every human brain is born not as a blank tablet (a tabula rasa) waiting to be filled in by experience but as ‘an exposed negative waiting to be slipped into developer fluid. I have to admit that evolutionary psychology of this kind is not something I have ever had a great deal of regard for; it tends to involve post-hoc extrapolations that are typically every bit as unfalsifiable as Freud’s theories. In either case, the term ‘just-so story’ seems amply deserved. It tends to disregard culture as a natural and material phenomenon and one that can be described as responding to a form of natural selection. If that is being displaced in favour of a more nuanced, tempered view, the I’ll certainly be happy.

Ostalgie

Posted in Communism, Film, Politics on June 3rd, 2007 by Richard

Slavoj Zizek reviews The Lives of Others:

"To put it quite brutally, while Ostalgie is widely practiced in today’s Germany without causing ethical problems, one (for the time being, at least) cannot imagine publicly practicing a Nazi nostalgia: "Good Bye Hitler" instead of "Good Bye Lenin." Doesn’t this bear witness to the fact that we are still aware of the emancipatory potential in Communism, which, distorted and thwarted as it was, was thoroughly missing in Fascism? The quasi-metaphysical epiphany toward the film’s end (when the mother, on her first walk outside the apartment, finds herself face-to-face with a Lenin-statue carried by the helicopter, whose outstretched hand seems to address her directly) is thus to be taken more seriously than it may appear.

This, of course, in no way implies that Good Bye Lenin! is without faults. The weak point of the film is that (like Roberto Benigni’s Life is Beautiful) it sustains the ethics of protecting one’s illusions: It manipulates the threat of a new heart attack as the means to blackmail us into accepting the need to protect one’s fantasy as the highest ethical duty. Isn’t the film then unexpectedly endorsing Leo Strauss’ thesis on the need for a “noble lie”? So is it really that the emancipatory potential of Communism is only a “noble lie” to be staged and sustained for the naive believers, a lie which effectively only masks the ruthless violence of the Communist rule? Here mother is the “subject supposed to believe”: through her, others sustain their belief. (The irony is that it is usually the mother who is supposed to be the caretaker, protecting children from cruel reality.)

The lesson of all this? We are still waiting for a film that would provide a complete description of the GDR terror, a film that would do for the Stasi what Varlam Shalamov, in his unsurpassed Kolyma Tales, did for the Gulag."

I find myself in agreement with Zizek that The Lives of Others is a far from complete description of the Stasi, an organisation that simply never witnessed one of its agent showing mercy towards a subject in the way the film depicts. This article presents a rather more acute political criticism of the film:

"No Stasi man ever tried to save his victims, because it was impossible. (We’d know if one had, because the files are so comprehensive.) Unlike Wiesler, who runs a nearly solo surveillance operation and can withhold the results from his superior, totalitarian systems rely on thoroughgoing internal surveillance (terror) and division of tasks. The film doesn’t accurately portray the way totalitarian systems work, because it needs to leave room for its hero to act humanely (something such systems are designed to prevent)… To understand why a Wiesler could not have existed is to understand the “total” nature of totalitarianism. Knabe talks of the fierce surveillance within the Stasi of its own men, of how in a case like Dreyman’s there might have been a dozen agents: everything was checked and cross-checked. This separation of duties gives some former Stasi men the impression that they were just “obeying orders”, or were “small cogs” in the machine, and that therefore they couldn’t have done much harm. Perhaps this is partly why repentance like Wiesler’s is rare. To my mind, hoping for salvation to come from the change of heart of a perpetrator is to misunderstand the nature of bureaucratised evil – the way great harms can be inflicted in minute, “legal” steps, or in decisions by committees carried out by people “just doing their jobs”."

With this, however, the agreements ends. The illusions perpetuated in Goodbye Lenin! are effectively a form of propaganda, something that the film is explicitly critiquing and which ensures that the ostalgie it depicts is decidedly ambivalent. But what I find most striking is Zizek’s insistence on the ‘emancipatory potential’ of communism alongside his admission that The Lives of Others is far from adequate in depicting the nature of state surveillance in East Germany. It is, for instance, rather difficult to see Stalin displacing Lenin in the title and helicopter scene, although Lenin was far from having different methods (a fact I rather thought Zizek had endorsed). More generally, surely it was the utopian ‘emancipatory potential’ of both fascism and communism that lay at the root of their danger, both being essentially religious rather than political phenomena.
Christianity asserts spirit as the ground of being for the presence of matter, while communism asserts materialiasm as the ground of becoming for the emerging mind. The invisible God promising the invisible Heavens was faced with the visible God promising the visible Earth. Dialectical idealism was opposed by dialectical materialism, and contemplation by action. Both are absolutist, both are deterministic, and both accept deductive logic as valid and the principle of noncontradiction as sound. The relationship between communism and christianity was essentially that of thesis and anti-thesis. As Koestler put it "the two poles of the Communist’s faith are longing for Utopia and rejection of the existing social order."